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I. Introductionl

Review of the 1969 decisions in juvenile law reveals that
the courts in California, as elsewhere, have been traumatized
by the recent transplant of constitutional due process into the
formerly barren soil of the juvenile code. For sixty years,
children in most American jurisdictions were hidden from
constitutional view. 2 The fiction persisted that they were
not tried but treated. If a child carne to the attention of the
juvenile court, he did so because his parents had failed to fulfill their function. The court succeeded to their role and,
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1. This article considers all the significant California cases since May,
1967, as well as mentioning every case
reported in the October, 1968, to October, 1969, period. There are three
justifications for the expanded scope of
the article. First, the starting date of
the review coincides with the United
States Supreme Court's decision in In
Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967). Juvenile law
cases since that date are subject to
meaningful analysis only in relation to
that decision. Second, this article intends to update the signficant overview
of California juvenile law presented in
the symposium on Youth and the Law,
19 Hastings L.J., No. 1 (Nov. 1967).
For the relatively uninitiated practitioner, the most useful article on the California juvenile system is Boches,
Juvenile Justice in California: A Re526

evaluation, 19 Hastings L.J. 47 (1967).
See, also, California Juvenile Court
Practice, California Continuing Education of the Bar, California Practice
Book No. 39 (1968); R. Cipes, How to
Defend a Criminal Case, Ch. 60 (Matthew Bender, 1969). Finally, the fact
that this is the first juvenile law article
in the Cal Law-Trends and Developments series excuses a more comprehensive orientation for understanding
of the recent cases.
2. The first juvenile court was created in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899.
Since then, every state has adopted a
separate court process for juveniles distinct from the normal adult criminal
procedures. For broad treatment of
the philosophy and practice of the
juvenile court system, see Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104
(1909).
CAL LAW 1970
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in the name of parens patriae, exercised only the power it had
thus derived to fashion an appropriate cure. Juvenile law
was said to be noncriminal. The forum was viewed not so
much as a court but as a social services laboratory, in which
the specimen unfortunately might be required to languish
until his majority rendered him judicially cognizable.
As every lawyer knows, the United States Supreme Court
has now finally discovered a place for juveniles within the
Constitution. Kent v. United States3 and In Re Gault4 have
found that a largely unfulfilled promise of corrective treatment does not justify the immunity of the juvenile process
from constitutional scrutiny. In the following Court term,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District5 brought the Constitution through the schoolhouse door.
Taken together, these three cases at least sketch the dimensions of the proposition that children, too, are citizens, entitled to fundamental constitutional rights and liberties.
It is within this still-obscure outline that the courts are
working. The present article, accordingly, traces the California response to Gault's imperative that the Constitution
be applied to those who are under the age of twenty-one.
II. In Re Gault: Answers and Questions
A. The Holding in Gault
Constitutional due process, applied to the juvenile court,
requires:
1. Adequate Notice of Charges:
Notice, to comply with due process requirements,
must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court
proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare
will be afforded, and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity. . . ."6
3.
S.Ct.
4.
S.Ct.

383 U.S. 541, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 86
1045 (1966).
387 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87
1428 (1967).

CAL LAW 1970
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5. 393 U.S. 503, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, 89
S.Ct. 733 (1969).
6~ 387 U.S. 1, 33, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
549, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1446 (1967).
527
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2. Right to Counsel:
[T]he child and his parent must be notified of the
child's right to be represented by counsel retained by
them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child [at delinquency proceedings at which commitment may resultV
3. Self-incrimination:
[T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles. 8
4. Confrontation and Cross-Examination:
[A]bsent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and
commitment
cannot
be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination. 9
B. What Gault Refused To Answer

Gault, and its precursor, Kent, expressly declined to consider a host of problems, and they are questions that litigation since Gault and Kent has tried to answer.
The issues that the Court in Gault expressly refused to answer are:
1. Right of appeal;
2. Right to a transcript of proceedings;lO
3. Rules of evidence-specifically the admissibility
of hearsay;
4. Rights at pre-judicial stages;
5. Rights at postadjudicative stages;
6. Right to bail;
7. 387 U.S. 1, 41, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
553, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1451.
8. 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
561,87 S.Ct. 1428, 1458.
9. 387 U.S. 1, 57, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
562-563, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1459.
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10. These first two points were urged
upon the Gault Court as independent
grounds for reversal. Because of the
528

Court's disposition of the case, it refused to reach determination of these
questions. (387 U.S. 1, 58, 18 L.Ed.2d
527, 563, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1459.) The
Court did, however, by reference to its
earlier decision in Kent, suggest the
constitutional importance of adequate
review of juvenile proceedings. Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561, 16
L.Ed.2d 84, 97, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966).
CAL LAW 1970
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Right to arraignment;
Right to indictment by grand jury;
Right to public trial;
Right to trial by jury;
Arrest without warrant in misdemeanor cases; and
Standard of proof.

C. Policy Considerations Not Raised by Gault
It is both predictable and proper that the United States
Supreme Court should have limited its Kent and Gault opinions to those questions required for disposition of the particular cases. But lower courts, including California's, in decisions since Gault, plainly have been troubled more by the
Court's failure to indicate a coherent analytical approach to
juvenile law then by the Court's refusal to adjudicate specific
issues not required for resolution of the cases before the
Court. The narrower questions could be answered more
readily if there were a consistent rationale within which to do
so. Unfortunately, Kent and Gault fail to provide such a
rationale.l1
The question of greatest significance is the precise extent
to which children possess the constitutional rights of their
elders. In Gault, the Court said that ".
neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
only . . . ,"12 and, again, that "[u]nder our Constitution,
the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.
• • • "13
Between the kangaroo court and the modern adult
criminal process stands a vast terrain, the terms of occupancy
of which the Supreme Court has not defined. In Gault, the
Court was content merely to repeat its earlier dictum in
Kent that "[t]he hearing must measure up to the essentials
of due process and fair treatment, . . ."14
11. See Welch, Kent v. United States
and In Re Gault: Two Decisions in
Search of A Theory, 19 Hastings LJ.
29 (1967). See generally Paulsen,
Kent v. United States, the Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 167.
CAL LAW 1970
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12. 387 U.S. 1, 13, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
538, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436 (1967).
13. 387 U.S. 1, 28, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
546-547, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1444.
14. 383 U.S. 541, 562, 16 L.Ed.2d
84, 97-98, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966).
529
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Several times in Gault, the Court took care to limit its discussion to delinquency proceedings that might result in commitment. 15 Thus, the applicability of constitutional standards to the important areas of dependency and neglect cases,
and, to some extent, wayward youth cases, is left untouched.
While Chief Judge Bazelon may be correct that "[t]he Supreme Court has recently revolutionized the procedural
aspects of juvenile court proceedings . . . ," Kent v. United
States 16 (still the same Kent, after remand), the cases discussed below leave no doubt that the revolution in California
is not yet over.
III. Post·Gault Statutory Changes

The premise of this review is that recent juvenile law cases
fall into a pattern on the basis of Gault, the questions it answered, and those it did not. It is also worth a brief look
at the legislative response to Gault. The statutory changes
serve two functions. First, they remove certain problems
from the courts' purview. Second, the legislative voice may
inform judicial consideration of the issues that remain.
The California Juvenile Court Law appears in Welfare
and Institutions Code sections 500 through 945, substantially
as it was reenacted in 1961. This revision cured many defects that Gault would have condemned. Still, ten changes
to the California Juvenile Court Law, all passed in 1967,
reflect the Gault decision by introducing or extending the mechanics of procedural due process from adult criminal procedures into the juvenile court. 17 Consistently with the dis-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/19

15. "We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional
provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state.
We do not even consider the entire
process relating to juvenile 'delinquents'
. . . We consider only . . . proceedings by which a determination is
made as to whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence
530

that he may be committed to a state
institution." 387 U.S. 1, 13, 18 L.Ed.
2d 527, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436
(1967).
16. 401 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir.
1968). But see the dissent in that case,
401 F.2d 408, 412-416, for some intimation of the views of the new United
States Supreme Court Chief Justice,
then Circuit Judge, Burger.
17. For a review of more recent CalCAL LAW 1970
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tinction made in Gault, all ten changes apply only to delinquent and wayward youth cases,18 and not to dependency and
neglect matters. 19
1. Welfare and Institutions Code section 625 has been
amended to require that all section 601 and section 602 minors
taken into temporary custody by a peace officer, must be advised of:
a. the priVilege against self-incrimination;
b. the right to remain silent;
c. the right to counsel; and
d. the right to appointment of counsel if the minor is
unable to afford one.
2. Welfare and Institutions Code section 627.5 was added to implement exercise of the same constitutional rights
at the time a minor is delivered into the custody of a probation officer.
3. Before 1967, if a probation officer filed a petition for
detention of a youth, notice of a detention hearing needed
to be given only to the minor's parents. Amendment of section 630 now additionally requires notice to the youth himself and provides him with the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confrontation by, and cross-examination of, witnesses at the detention hearing.
4. New section 630.1 extends all rights to notice to a
youth's counsel of record.
5. Where appointment of counsel at detention hearings
formerly was discretionary, amendment of section 634 now
makes appointment mandatory in virtually every situation.
6. Sections 658 and 660 enlarge notice requirements relating to the adjudicatory hearing.
7. The amendment to section 679 directs the court to
ifornia legislative considerations of the
juvenile court law, see Comment, The
California Juvenile: His Rights and
Remedies, 1 Pacific L.J. 350 (1970).
18. Delinquent juveniles are described in Welfare and Institutions Code
CAL LAW 1970
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§ 602. Wayward youths are described
in Welfare and Institutions Code § 601.
19. Dependent and neglected children
are described in Welfare and Institutions Code § 600.
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appoint an attorney, at the adjudicatory stage, for minors
who are unable to afford counsel and who are alleged to be
within Welfare and Institutions Code sections 601 or 602.
8. Section 700 repeats the directive that alleged delinquent and wayward youths be represented by counsel at the
jurisdictional hearing.
9. The Gault guarantees of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confrontation by, and crossexamination of, witnesses is codified in section 702.5.
10. Although the Court in Gault expressly declined to decide the issue, the right of a youth unable to afford counsel
to be furnished a free copy of the hearing transcript for appeal is embodied in an amendment to section 800.
One final 1967 statutory change deserves discussion:
the amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.
That section provides the procedure variously known as referral, transfer, or waiver by the juvenile court of a minor, 16
years of age or older and unfit for treatment within the facilities of the juvenile court, to adult criminal court. Kent v.
United States involved such a proceeding, and the subject
amendment obviously was intended to bring section 707 into
conformity with that decision. While Kent was decided within
the context of a District of Columbia statute, the case's holding, that a waiver order must be accompanied by a sufficiently
specific statement of the reasons for the order,20 has been
incorporated into section 707. Waiver now cannot be predicated solely on the nature of the alleged offense but must be
supported by an investigative report of the minor's "behavioral
patterns." Presumably, Kent's requirement of representation
by counsel at the waiver hearing is satisfied by the provision
of Welfare and Institutions Code section 633 that a minor

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/19

20. 383 U.S. 541, 561, 16 L.Ed.2d
84,97,86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057. The reason
for the requirement is to permit adequate review. Kent also decided that
waiver may be accomplished only at a
hearing where the minor may be represented by counsel, who is entitled to
see the child's social records to be con532

sidered by the Court. The Court mandated a hearing containing the "essentials of due process and fair treatment,"
383 U.S. 541, 562, 16 L.Ed.2d 84,
97-98, 86 S.Ct. 1045. See, Paulsen,
Kent v. United States, the Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
Sup. Ct. Rev. 167 (1966).
CAL LAW 1970
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has the". . . right . . . to be represented at every stage
of the proceeding by counsel."

IV. The Recent Cases
A. Standard of Proof2o.5
Welfare and Institutions Code section 701 requires that an
adjudication that a minor is a delinquent must be supported
by "a preponderance of evidence."l The adult criminal standard, of course, calls for proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."2
The question whether Gault impliedly compels the higher
standard of proof in juvenile cases has now been before the
United States Supreme Court three times but remains unanswered: In Re Whittington,3 (judgment vacated and case
remanded for consideration in light of Gault); De Backer v.
Brainard,4 (issue not properly raised); In Re Winship,5 (probable jurisdiction noted) .
While definitive resolution may appear elusive, the question
has been set to rest in California by the state Supreme Court
in In Re M.6 There, the court held simply that "in the absence of a specific ruling on the issue by the United States
Supreme Court, we adhere to the pre-Gault view of our courts
that the established standard [of proof upon a preponderance
20.5. Since preparation of this article the United States Supreme Court
has ruled that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when they are charged with
a violation of criminal law, In re Winship, 396 U.S. -, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90
S.Ct. 1068, - . The Court noted and
overruled the California Supreme Court
decision in In Re Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d
444, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296
(1969), the case discussed in this section
of the article on standard of proof.
Nothing in the United States Supreme
Court decision requires extended discussion.
The Court's analysis and
rationale seem totally consistent with
the approach and the conclusion of
this article.
CAL LAW 1970
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1. The same standard of proof, "a
preponderance of evidence," applies to
findings of §§ 600, 601, and 602. A distinction is made, however, in that a §
602 finding must be based on evidence
"legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases," while the less stringent test
of "legally admissible in the trial of civil
cases" applies to § 600 and § 601 cases.
2. Penal Code § 1096.
3. 391 U.S. 341, 20 L.Ed.2d 625, 88
S.Ct. 1507 (1968).
4. 396 U.S. 28, 24 L.Ed.2d 60, 148,
90 S.Ct. 163 (1969).
5. 396 U.S. 28, 24 L.Ed.2d 160, 90
S.Ct. 179 (1969).
6. 70 Cal.2d 444, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1,
450 P.2d 296.
533

9

Cal Law TrendsJuveuile
and Developments,
Law Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 19

of the evidence] is valid.,,7 In Re M is a lengthy and farranging opinion, the California Supreme Court's only juvenile
law decision in 1969, and it deserves some statement of the
facts.
The minor stole an automobile from which he removed
a .22 caliber revolver. Ten days later, he visited his 15-yearold girlfriend and had talked with her outside her house for
about 15 minutes when a shot was fired. The girlfriend's
father emerged from the house and found his daughter shot
in the head. No one was present but the minor. M told the
father that a passerby had fired the shot and promptly went off
in pursuit. The minor shortly returned without success,
and when a sheriff arrived on the scene, repeated the assertion
that a passerby was responsible for the crime. An hour later,
however, confronted by more sheriffs, who had found a .22 caliber revolver in a nearby flowerbed, the minor admitted he
had shot the girl. He said it was an accident; he had been
playing with the gun. Four days later, the girl died. The
minor was charged with involuntary manslaughter, gun theft,
and auto theft, and a Welfare and Institutions Code section
602 petition was filed and sustained. The minor, who previously had been a ward of the court, was committed to the
Youth Authority.
Justice Mosk, writing for the court, makes a two-part
analysis of the standard-of-proof issue. First, he examines
the explicit holding of Gault and concludes that the United
States Supreme Court did not expressly require application
of the adult standard. Indeed, that question, having been
raised on appeal from an Arizona decision, was among the
issues the court refrained from considering. s
Then the broader question is posed: did Gault ". . . by
implication [require] that this element of adult criminal trials
be incorporated into our juvenile court law,,?9 Stated dif7. 70 Ca1.2d 444, 460-462, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 11, 450 P.2d 296, 305-306.
8. 387 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 537,
87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967). See the section
"What Gault Refused To Answer," su-

9. 70 Cal.2d 444, 453-454, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6, 450 P.2d 296, 300-301
(1969).

pra.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/19
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ferently, is the higher standard of proof one of those "essentials of due process and fair treatment"IO that the Constitution
extends to juveniles?
For guidance upon this issue, the court looks to decisions
of sister courts, opinions of law review writers, recommendations of model act draftsmen, and the views of a multitude of
scholars. The survey yields only "disarray" and "divergence."
Attention also turned to the legislature. The court reviews
the work of the 1957 Special Commission on Juvenile Law,ll
the revised Juvenile Act that resulted from the commission's
study/2 and, finally, the 1967 legislative response to Gault.
The Court concluded that "the legislature, moreover, has been
fully responsive to Gault."13
The pivotal criterion adopted by the court is then articulated: "Such deliberate acts of the Legislature come before us
clothed with a presumption of constitutionality."14 Applying
this presumption, the court concluded:
[I]n any event, we cannot say that the Legislature plainly
exceeded constitutional limits in finding that the benefits of the reasonable doubt standard would be outweighed by the adverse effects of imposing that doctrine
of adult criminal law on the essentially remedial proceedings of the juvenile court. I5
The nub of the decision on this issue, then, is the characterization of the juvenile process as "essentially remedial."
But this is to echo the time-dishonored rhetoric that Gault
10. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 562, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97-98, 86
S.Ct. 1045 (1966).
11. Report of Governor's Special
Study Commission on Juvenile Justice
(1960).
12. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1616, pp. 34593508.
13. 70 Cal.2d 444, 453-454, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6, 450 P.2d 296, 300-301
(1969).
14. 70 Cal.2d 444, 453-454, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6, 450 P.2d 296, 300-301
CAL LAW 1970
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(1969). Regardless of the general utility of this maxim, its precise reference
is far from clear. Presumably, the
phrase "deliberate acts" does not refer
to the 1961 enactment, which, of course,
predated Gault. But should the legislature's 1967 amendments to other statutes in the Juvenile Code, taken together
with its silence regarding the § 701
standard of proof, be dignified as "deliberate acts"?
15. 70 Cal.2d 444, 457-458, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 9, 450 P.2d 296, 303-304.
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meant to silence. However laudable the court's reluctance to
"introduce a strong tone of criminality into the proceedings,"16
incarceration, the same consequence as that which results from
a "criminal" trial, emanates from the juvenile proceeding.
Gault expressly rejects the notion that the serious ramifications of the juvenile court adjudication may in any way be
sloughed off simply by declaring the process "remedial." "A
proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for
years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."17
The Court continued, "Neither sentiment nor folklore should
cause us to shut our eyes.,,18
But even assuming that rehabilitation of minors is enhanced
by their separate and different treatment, it does not follow
that these benefits are lost by "constitutional domestication"
of the juvenile process. Indeed, the principle established by
Gault is that while not every feature of the adult criminal
procedure must be afforded juveniles, neither may the absence of such safeguards be justified except upon the clearest
showing that their implementation would substantially disrupt
the juvenile law concept. "But the features of the juvenile
system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication. For
example, the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in
no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under discussion. "19
Application of this test to the issue of standard of proof
presented by In Re M-would the requirement of proof be-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/19

16. 70 Ca1.2d 444, 456-457, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 8, 450 P.2d 296, 302-303.
17. 387 U.S. 1, 36, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
551, 87 S.Ct. 1428, - (1967).
18. 387 U.S. 1, 21, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
541-542, 87 S.Ct. 1428, - . "Here
again, however, there is substantial question as to whether fact and pretension,
with respect to the separate handling and
treatment of children, . . . coincide
it should be noted that to the
536

extent that the special procedures for
juveniles are thought to be justified by
the special consideration and treatment
afforded them, there is reason to doubt
that juveniles always receive the benefits of such a quid pro quo." 387
U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 543, 87 S.Ct.
1428.
19. 387 U.S. 1, 22, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
543, 87 S.Ct. 1428.
CAL LAW 1970

12

Hecht: Juvenile Law

Juvenile Law

yond a reasonable doubt militate against the rehabilitative
goal of the juvenile court-produces a result contrary to that
which the California court reached. Nor does the decision
contain adequate support, in spite of its length, for such a result. There is a suggestion that "speedy and individualized
rehabilitative services," and "a prompt factual decision," are
in the minor's best interests. This may certainly be so. But
there is no reason why a higher standard of proof precludes
promptness. There is no reason to believe that an appearance of unreliability, even in the name of speedy adjudication, enhances the juvenile court's rehabilitative goals. 20
To attribute a presumption of constitutionality to the legislature is to abdicate the court's role. Gault requires realism.
As Justice Peters in his dissent makes clear:
Realistically, a proceeding that may result in such confinement and restraint is adversary in nature and criminal in effect. To hold that such a proceeding is not
adversary in nature and criminal in effect is to close
one's eyes to the realities of the situation, and, as well,
is contrary to the teachings of Gault. 1
In Re M indicates the California Supreme Court's unwillingness to conform the state's juvenile law to the spirit of
Gault. The letter of Gault has been codified. The guiding
principle of that opinion, however, that the fundamentals of
constitutional due process-including proof beyond a reasonable doubt-be excluded from the juvenile law only if they
deprive a minor of the special and beneficial status that the
juvenile law should accord, has been rejected.
Several California Courts of Appeal have also been con20. "Whenever juvenile courts do not
scrupulously follow the principles of
procedural due process in their dealings
with minors-whenever the juvenile is
lulled into a feeling of serenity only to
receive stern disciplining-he 'feels that
he has been deceived or enticed,' and
thus rebels against and resists the rehabilitative efforts of the court personCAL LAW 1970
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nel." In Re H.L.R., 269 Cal. App.2d
610, 75 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1969), citing
Wheeler and Cottrell, Juvenile Delinquency-Its Prevention and Control,
Russell Sage Foundation, 1966, p. 35.
1. 70 Cal.2d 444, 465-466, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 14-15, 450 P.2d 296, 308-309
(1969).
537
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fronted with the standard-of-proof issue.! In Re K.D.K.,3
like In re M, considers, as it should, that Gault is controlling.
But, again, like the California Supreme Court, the lower court
was impressed that California's juvenile laws "already were
free of the specific defects found constitutionally fatal in
Gault."4 Thus, determination of the specific standard-ofproof question is made to depend on (I) confining the effect
of Gault to the limited holding of the case, and (2) the seemingly fortuitous circumstance that many other provisions of the
state's Juvenile Code were revised in 1961.
Perhaps most unfortunate is the K.D.K. court's retention of
the juvenile law rhetoric: "We are not prepared to depart
from the holdings of the California courts that proceedings
in the juvenile court are, indeed, of a civil nature."5 Nor is it
deemed persuasive that the juvenile court hearing "may result
in a deprivation of liberty to the juvenile."
Thus, the Court refused to recognize the "realities" of the
Gault analysis of juvenile proceedings, for example, "the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state institution until the
juvenile reaches the age of 2l."6 In this sense, K.D.K. is seen
to be a pre-Gault decision. Indeed, the Court's failure to
apply the Gault approach may be explained by its dictum that
"[the juvenile court system] can hardly suffer further attrition and maintain its essential character.,,7
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2. While the standard-of-proof contention was raised in In re F, 270 Cal.
App.2d 603, 75 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1969),
the court of appeal thought the issue
conclusively determined by In Re M,
supra, and summarily rejected the argument.
3. 269 Cal. App.2d 646, 75 Cal. Rptr.
136 (1969).
4. 269 Cal. App.2d 646, 652, 75
Cal. Rptr. 136, 140-141.
5. 269 Cal. App.2d 646, 653, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 136, 141.
6. 387 U.S. 1, 36, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
551, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967).
7. 269 Cal. App.2d 646, 750. The
standard-of-proof issue was raised in a
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novel context in the case of In Re
J.F., 268 Cal. App.2d 761, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 464 (1969). The case involved a
Welfare and Institutions Code § 1800
proceeding at which the California
Youth Authority is authorized to petition the court for continued commitment of a person who reaches 21 years
of age and whose discharge "would be
physically dangerous to the public because of his mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality." The
court noted that no statutory standard
of proof is prescribed for § 1800 proceedings. The court distinguished a
§ 1800 hearing from a § 602 hearing,
at which proof of a criminal act is required. The court stated that § 1800
CAL LAW 1970
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B. Waiver of Miranda Rights

The express holding in Gault introduced into the juvenile
field the constitutional rights enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court one year earlier in Miranda v. Arizona. s
Miranda held that:
[P]rior to any questioning [by law enforcement officers
of a suspect], the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. 9
The Court also stated that a defendant may waive these
rights, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently."lo Applied to the juvenile process, waiver
of counsel raises the question whether a minor, because of
his age, can ever "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently"
waive his rights. The answer in California is that he can.
The leading case on juvenile waiver of Miranda rights is
People v. Lara. ll Lara and In Re M are the California Supreme Court's only juvenile law decisions since Gault. Both
Lara and M were six-to-one decisions, written by Justice Mosk,
with dissents by Justice Peters.
Lara and his codefendant, Alvarez, were convicted, in adult
criminal court, of murder. 12 Both had been advised several
times during the course of police investigation of their Miranda
rights. Both nonetheless wrote out and signed confessions to
the crime. Neither took advantage of his right to counsel.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected the arguproceedings more closely resemble narcotics proceedings. Then, even assuming that Gault applied to § 1800 hearings, the court found the "civil" nature
of the proceeding to justify the preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof.
8. 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 10 AL.R.3d 974 (1966).
9. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.Ed.2d 694,
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706, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 AL.R.3d 974,
993.
10. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.Ed.2d
694, 706, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 AL.R.3d
974, 993.
11. 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr.
586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967).
12. Lara was 18 years old and Alvarez was one month short of 18 at
the time the crime was committed.
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ment that no minor is capable of effective waiver unless the
waiver is also consented to by a friendly adult-parent,
guardian, or attorney-who himself has received a Miranda
warning. 13 Instead, the court adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test:
"This, then, is the general rule: a minor has the capacity
to make a voluntary confession, even of capital offenses,
without the presence or consent of counselor other responsible adult, and the admissibility of such a confession
depends not on his age alone but on a combination of
that factor with other circumstances as his intelligence,
education, experience, and ability to comprehend the
meaning and effect of his statement."14
Both defendants contended that they had not intelligently
and understandingly waived their rights. They argued that
they were member,« of a minority group, with little education
(ninth or tenth grade) and IiO money, and were affected
by alcohol and lack of sleep. A psychologist testified without
contradiction that Alvarez had an 1.0. of 65 to 71, "mild
mental retardation," and a mental age of 10 years, 2 months.
A pyschiatrist for the state in rebuttal said that Alvarez possessed "innate shrewdness" and "the accumulated life experience of a 17-year-old person."15
The Court rejected some of the minor's assertions, minimized others, and concluded that, in the totality of the circumstances, the waivers had been effective. The factors that militated most unfavorably against the minors seemed to be (1)
their demeanor during the interrogation ("very calm" and
"cognizant and aware"); (2) their relatively advanced age
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13. 67 Ca1.2d 365, 378-380, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 586, 596, 432 P.2d 202, 212.
Justice Peters, in dissent, states that
this should be the rule. It is not certain
whether his opinion squares with the
California legislature'S amendment to
Code of Civ. Proc. § 372 shortly after
the Gault decision issued. The pertinent part of that amendment reads:
"Nothing in this section or in any other
540

provision . . . is intended by the
legislature to prohibit a minor from exercising an intelligent and knowing
waiver of his constitutional rights in any
proceeding under the Juvenile Court
Law. . . ."
14. 67 Cal.2d 365, 383-384, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 586, 599, 432 P.2d 202, 215.
15. 67 Cal.2d 365, 377-378, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 586, 595, 432 P.2d 202, 211.
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(about 18) ; (3) their prior experience with the police; and (4)
their apparent comprehension of the warning (each wrote a
statement of Miranda rights into his confession).
On these facts, Justice Peters concedes, the majority properly could have applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test
to have found that an adult had effectively waived the Miranda
rights. But, the dissent argues, this begs the question whether,
because of his age, a minor, alone, ever can effectively waive
his constitutional rights. The court's mistake, Justice Peters
writes, is to emphasize the conduct of the police, rather than
the competency of the youth. Had the court's focus been on
the capacity of the minor, the court would have had to acknowledge the minor's general legal incompetence in civil
matters. As one writer has pointed out, the civil law establishes the presumption of incompetence to protect the vast
number of minors, even though it is certain that a few, in fact,
are capable of protecting their own interests. 16 Adoption of
this presumption to the Miranda waiver would require the
police to refrain from interrogating the minor until he is in the
company of a friendly adult. Apparently, the State Supreme
Court is not ready to place this burden on the police. 16.5
As Justice Peters points out, the cases most relied on by
the court reach a contrary result. 17 In these decisions, the
16. Note, Waiver of Constitutional
Rights by Minors: A Question of
Law or Fact?, 19 Hastings L.J. 223 at
224 (1967).
16.5. A recent federal district court
decision reaches a contrary conclusion.
In holding that the state had failed to
provide adequate legal assistance to
minors brought before the juvenile court
in San Francisco, the court held that
the law required that counsel be provided at the "first point of contact,"
at that critical stage in the proceedings
when the "juveniles are faced with the
awesome determination whether to
waive counsel." Scott v. Mayer, N. D.
Cal. Civil No. C-70 441 GSL (April
13, 1970).
CAL. LAW 1970
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17. The majority cites the leading
cases from the United States Supreme
Court: Gallegos v. State of Colorado,
370 U.S. 49, 8 L.Ed.2d 325, 82 S.Ct.
1209, 87 AL.R.2d 614 (1962) and
Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
92 L.Ed. 224, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948). See
also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 9
L.Ed.2d 770,83 S.Ct. 745 (1963); Reck
v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 6 L.Ed.2d 948,
81 S.Ct. 1541 (1961); Payne v. State
of Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 2 L.Ed.2d
975, 78 S.Ct. 884 (1958); Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 499, 1 L.Ed.2d
1479, 77 S.Ct. 1356 (1957).
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focus was on the minors, variously described as "a mere child,"
"an easy victim of the law," "tender and difficult," "a lad in
his early teens."
The failure to place principal emphasis on the special status
of minors exposes the court to Justice Peters' criticism that it
disregards Gault18 and relegates minors to the second-class
citizenship from which Gault and Kent tried to free them. 18 .5
Lara and In Re M, read together, reveal the California
Supreme Court's determination to limit Gault to its precise
holding. The United States Supreme Court was able to decide
that case on the basis of four aspects of the adjudicatory
hearing. In Re M refuses to extend Gault to other facets
of that hearing. Lara refuses to extend Gault back to the preadjudicatory stages. 19
In Lara, the California Supreme Court held juveniles to
the adult test for effective waiver, consideration of age having some unknown effect. But in In Re M, the court withholds from juveniles the benefit of adult standard of proof.
As the United States Supreme Court noted:
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18. The Lara court's sole acknowledgment of Gault is contained in one
footnote, which begins, "Our decision
here is not affected by In Re Gault,"
67 Ca1.2d 365, 391, 392, 62 Cal. Rptr.
586, 604, fn. 21, 432 P.2d 202, 220
(1967). This statement by the court is
not a completely accurate reflection of
Gault. Gault contained the following
guidance, unheeded by the Lara court,
with regard to the Miranda issue: "If
counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was
obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was
voluntary, in the sense not only that it
has not been coerced or suggested, but
also that it is not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy,
fright, or despair," 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18
L.Ed.2d 527, 561, 87 S.Ct. 1428
(1967).
18.5. But c/. In re R., 1 Cal.2d 855,
542

83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127 (1970),
a California Supreme Court decision issued since preparation of this article.
The court holds "that the juvenile court
should consider whether a child appreciates the wrongfulness of his conduct in determining whether the child
should be declared a ward of section
602 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code (Pen. Code, § 26)."
19. The California court's restrictive
approach is no less clear in the limitation of both Haley, supra, and Gal/egos,
supra, to their strict holding. "For our
present purposes, however, the primary
significance of Haley and Gallegos is
that the high court declined to hold
that as a matter of law all minors without such advice [of a friendly adult]
lack the capacity to make voluntary
confessions," 67 Cal.2d 365, 382-383,
62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 598, 432 P.2d 202,
214.
CAL LAW 1970
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There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds
for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children. 20
The waiver rule was also in issue in In Re M. The facts
present a 15-year-old boy to whom the Miranda warning was
read from a card. At trial, the sheriff who testified as to the
warning was unable to state all of it, as required by Miranda.
Nevertheless, the court held the minor's waiver effective.
A minor's waiver was found to be effective in People v.
Camarillo. 1 Camarillo, 17 years old, was convicted of murder
on his signed statement. Apparently, his attorney at trial
objected to introduction of the statement solely on the basis
that the defendant was under 18. Thus, when the court applied the Lara totality-of-the-circumstances rule, there was
no evidence either of unfairness on the part of the police or
of particular disabilities of the youth-mentality, education,
or the like. In fact, the only evidence deemed pertinent by the
court was harmful: "roving about at late hours, committing
crimes of violence and associating with codefendants."2 Thus,
the court inferred from Lara a presumption of effective waiver
that could be overcome only by evidence of a youth's incapacity. It is doubtful that the Lara court intended this result or that Gault permits it.
There are four California Courts of Appeal decisions holding evidence in juvenile proceedings to be inadmissible because there had been no effective waiver of Miranda rights.
The first of these, chronologically, is In Re Butterfield. 3 The
petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding was a 15-year-old
girl uncontradictedly described as a "schizophrenic reaction,
schizoaffective type." At the juvenile court's adjudicatory
hearing, the petition against the juvenile was read to her and
20. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 556,
16 L.Ed.2d 84, 94-95, 86 S.Ct. 1045,
1054 (1966).
1. 266 Cal. App.2d 523, 72 Cal. Rptr.
296 (1968).
CAL LAW 1970
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2. 266 Cal. App.2d 523,531-532.72
Cal. Rptr. 296, 301.
3. 253 Cal. App.2d 794, 61 Cal. Rptr.
874 (967),
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she answered affirmatively to the probation officer's inquiry
whether the charges were true. On this basis alone, the petition was sustained.
The reviewing court held this self-incriminating statement
to be inadmissible. The court did so even though the record
reflected that the girl was accompanied by her mother at the
hearing and that both of them were advised of the minor's
right to counsel. Nonetheless, the court found, relying on
Gault, that "[t]he formal and literal waiver of counsel was
ineffectual because [it was] not made with an intelligent understanding of its consequences."4 This was so because there
was no evidence that the minor had any awareness of her
right to refrain from self-incrimination. Indeed, the court
found the emotionally disturbed minor to have no comprehension that long-term confinement in a correctional institution
was a possible consequence. 6
The minor in In Re T eters6 was found to be a ward of the
court on the basis of his confession that he had stolen an automobile. The confession constituted the only evidence on
which the adjudication was made. The appellant had been
taken into custody initially on the belief that he was a runaway. The police had reason to believe that he might be responsible for an auto theft that had recently occurred. Once
in custody, the minor was asked about the automobile, and
eventually admitted that he had taken the car. At that point,
the officer advised the minor of his Miranda rights, by read4. 253 Cal. App.2d 794, 797-798,
61 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877.
5. In a very perceptive dictum, the
court decried the probation department's filing of a § 602 petition alleging
that the minor was a delinquent. Originally, a § 601 petition was filed because
the child had run away from her parent's home. Before the petition could
be heard, the minor was committed to a
mental institution for three 90-day periods. At the completion of this commitment, the petition was heard and
the girl found to be a § 601 ward of
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the court. A month later, the girl ingested an overdose of pills. It was on
the basis of this suicide attempt alone
that the § 602 petition was filed. Such
an escalation is permitted whenever a
ward of the court disobeys a lawful order of the court. The reviewing court
characterized her suicide attempt as a
product of psychic imbalance in no way
associated with the opprobrium reflected by a § 602 delinquency petition.
6. 264 Cal. App.2d 816, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1968).
CAL LAW 1970
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ing them from a card. The minor then made a complete confession, which was repeated at the adjudicatory hearing.
The reviewing court held that Miranda attached as soon as
the minor was in custody, because at that time he was suspected of auto theft. The court admitted that the police officers
were neither oppressive nor coercive. Nevertheless, the court
determined that the admission was made "under the conditions which invite coerced confessions and other evils of custodial interrogation and falls within the scope of the Miranda
warning rule."7
In determining whether the subsequent confession made in
court was necessarily tainted, the reviewing court followed
Gault in reaching a determination. The reviewing court
stated that Gault applied the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination to juveniles as well as to adults. Therefore,
based on California decisions in adult criminal trials, the
court determined that the confession at trial was impelled by
the minor's extrajudicial confession and that the pre-trial confession was inadmissible.
Again, in In Re Rambeau,S the minor's wardship under section 601 was predicated solely upon a confession. Here, the
court found the Miranda warning had been given. However,
the court went on, "[C]ompliance with the requirement of
warning contained in [Miranda] is not enough to settle the
matter, at least in a case involving a minor."9 After quoting
extensively from Gault, the court stated the reasons that the
confession, made during an illegal detention, could not be
separated from such unlawful detention. First, no attempt
was made to contact the 17-year-old minor's father. Second,
the court noted that Welfare and Institutions Code section
625 authorizes a police officer to take a minor into temporary
custody without a warrant but, unless the minor is promptly
released, he must be taken without delay before a probation
officer. The police did not do this, but instead detained him
7. 264 Cal. App.2d816, 820-821, 70
Cal. Rptr. 749, 752.
8. 266 Cal. App.2d 1, 72 Cal. Rptr.
171 (1968).
CAL LAW 1970
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9. 266 Cal. App.2d 1, 4-5, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 171, 174.
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and proceeded to interrogate him. Third, the court found
the generality of the questioning by the police to be an invitation to a confession of guilt.
In Re H.L.R./o involved a particularly unsavory instance
of police interrogation of a 16-year-old grossly affected by
drugs. Applying the Lara totality-of-the-circumstances test to
the question of effective waiver of Miranda rights, the court
found that, in the circumstances described, the prosecution
had failed to establish its burden of proof that the minor's
waiver had been effective. l l
C. Admissibility of Evidence
Two cases addressed themselves to the importance of the
Welfare and Institutions Code's insistence on a bifurcated
hearing and a related requirement that the probation officer's
social study of the juvenile to be offered the court be withheld
until jurisdiction of the court has been adjudicated. In the
earlier days of the juvenile court, the probation officer's report
concerning a youth, replete with extrajudicial statements of
varying degrees of reliability, was furnished the judge before the jurisdictional hearing. Theoretically, he disregarded
the information in the report in determining the issue of jurisdiction. This practice was heavily criticized in the report of
the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice,
1960. Consequently, the 1961 Juvenile Court Act eliminated
this practice. Two clear stages of the juvenile court proceedings-one jurisdictional, and the other dispositional-were
established. Welfare and Institutions Code sections 701, 702,
and 706, taken together, permit the judge to consider the probation officer's report only at the dispositional stage, after jurisdiction has been found.
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10. 269 Cal. App.2d 610, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 308 (1969).
11. 269 Cal. App.2d 610, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 308. Two other cases provide
perspective on the question of effective
waiver. People v. Cooper, 268 Cal.
App.2d 34, 73 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1968)
approves the appointment of counsel
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for a 15-year-old witness. Such solicitude profitably could be transported into
the Miranda waiver cases. On the other hand, an ll-year-old boy was found
to be criminally negligent in the case of
In Re T.R.S., 1 Cal. App.3d 178, 81
Cal. Rptr. 574 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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In the case of In Re Corey/2 the reviewing court determined that there was substantial admissible evidence on which
to sustain the court's imposition of jurisdiction under section
602. Nonetheless, because the probation report had been
considered by the juvenile court before the jurisdictional
hearing was conducted, the reviewing court reversed the judgment. "Where the commission of a crime is alleged as the
jurisdictional fact and the allegation is disputed, the court's
error in receiving the social study before the jurisdictional
hearing goes so directly to the fairness of the hearing that the
resulting adjudication is [invalid].
.'>13 Both the language and the approach of this opinion accurately reflect the
philosophy of Gault.
Reversal was required, too, in In Re F.l4 In this case, as
in Corey, the court had examined the probation report before
resolving the disputed allegations of the section 602 petition.
The reviewing court found the adjudication invalidated by
premature consideration of the probation report, which the
court characterized as containing much hearsay, prejudicial
matter unrelated to the charged offense, and recommendations
unfavorable to the minor. 16
Two other cases involved questions of the admissibility of
evidence in juvenile hearings. In Re M.G.S. 16 establishes the
salutary rule that an admission of guilt cannot be made by
a minor's attorney, but must be offered by the minor himself.
The reviewing court found that it was obligatory on the
juvenile court to reject the offered admission. Admission by
counsel alone provides no basis on which to sustain a delinquency petition.
In Re Rambeau,17 previously discussed in the waiver section
12. 266 Cal. App.2d 295, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 115 (1968).
13. 266 Cal. App.2d 295, 298-299,
72 Cal. Rptr. 115, 118.
14. 270 Cal. App.2d 603, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 887 (1969).
15. 270 Cal. App.2d 603, 604-605,
75 Cal. Rptr. 887, 888. These two
cases, In re Corey and In re F, have
CAL LAW 1970
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now been approved by a decision of
the California Supreme Court issued
since preparation of this article, In re
R, 1 Ca1.3d 855, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671,
464 P.2d 127 (1970).

16. 267 Cal. App.2d 329, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 808 (1968).
17. 266 Cal. App.2d 1, 72 Cal. Rptr.
171 (1968).
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above, also stands for the proposition that a statement taken
in violation of Miranda rights is inadmissible in a section 601
proceeding, as well as one under section 602. The distinction
between the two proceedings is, of course, in the type of evidence that can be received. Both proceedings require that the
allegations of the petition be sustained only on a preponderance of evidence. But in the section 602 hearing, evidence
may be received only if it is admissible in the trial of criminal
cases. In section 601 hearings, however, evidence admissible
in the trial of civil cases is sufficien t. 18 Nevertheless, even
conceding that a section 601 proceeding may be "civil," the
Rambeau court construed the Gault requirement of fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings to require the exclusion
of statements obtained in violation of Miranda.
D. Right to Jury Trial
In Re T.R.S.19 raises the major issue of the minor's right to
trial by jury.20 Unfortunately, the court disposes of the contention with only cursory consideration. The court refers
to Gault for the proposition that "the federal Constitution
'does not require that the full panoply of rights accorded to
an adult accused of crime be erected in the juvenile court.' "1
Relying on In Re M, the court rejected trial by jury because
it would "introduce a strong tone of criminality into the proceedings. "2
18. Welf. and lnst. Code § 701.
19. 1 Cal. App.3d 178, 81 Cal. Rptr.
574 (1969).
20. This question was raised but not
decided in De Backer v. Brainard, 396
U.S. 28, 24 L.Ed.2d 148, 90 S.Ct. 163
(Nov. 12, 1969), and in the Gault decision itself.
1. 1 Cal. App.3d 178, 181-183, 81
Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1969) (citing In Re
M., 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4).
2. 70 Cal.2d 444, 456, 75 Cal. Rptr.
1, 8, 450 P.2d 296, 302-303, but com-
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pare In Re M, 70 Cal.2d 444, 465-466,
75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 14, 450 P.2d 296, 308309 (dissenting opinion): "Certainly
the right to a jury trial and the right to
insist that guilt be shown beyond a
reasonable doubt are fundamental and
constitutional rights in a criminal case."
See also Boches, Juvenile Justice in
California: ARe-evaluation, 19 Hastings L.J., 47, 88-90, where a strong
argument is advanced that Gault may
compel the right to trial by jury for
juveniles.
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E. Referral to Adult Court
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 waiver proceedings are strongly affected by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Kent, a waiver case, as well as by the general philosophy of Gault. In the decision of M v. Superior
Court,3 waiver was predicated solely on the basis of the offense
that the minor allegedly had committed. The reviewing court
found this result to be prohibited by the 1967 amendment to
section 707, which expressly states that "the offense, in itself,
shall not be sufficient to support [waiver]." Additionally,
there was a failure of the probation department to submit, and
the court to consider, a report on the behavioral patterns of
the minor that is also required by section 707. Accordingly,
transfer of the minor to an adult court was invalidated.
M v. Superior Court relied heavily on the decision in
Richerson v. Superior Court.4 Here again, transfer was determined without reference to the minor's behavioral background. Indeed, an extensive description of the minor presents
the picture of a youth completely amenable to the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court. Ultimately, the reviewing
court was compelled to conclude that the trial judge must have
"overlooked" the 1967 amendment to section 707.
F. Section 600 Dependency and Neglect Cases
The 1967 report of the National Crime Commission recommended that juvenile court jurisdiction over dependent
youths be abolished, since such cases involve inability, rather
than willful failure, to provide properly for children, and can
more appropriately be dealt with by social, nonjudicial agencies. Indeed, section 600 proceedings, involving, as they do,
no "act" of the child at all, are at best an anomaly in any court.
Recent dependency cases illustrate the inadequacy of the
juvenile court to deal with such situations.
The most significant recent dependency case is In Re Raya. 5
3. 270 Cal. App.2d 566, 75 Cal. Rptr.
881 (1969).
4. 264 Cal. App.2d 729, 70 Cal. Rptr.
350 (1968).
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Rptr 252 (1967).
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There, section 600 petitions were sustained against a whole
family of children, both their parents were deprived of custody, and the children were committed to an institution. The
conclusion that the children lacked proper and effective care
and control rested solely on the circumstance that the children's natural parents each had lived in unmarried cohabitation with other partners for more than five years. What the
juvenile court failed to consider, however, was: ( 1) that the
mother's extramarital relationship was a stable one in which
the children were happy, healthy, well-adjusted, and provided
with love, security, and physical well-being,6 and (2) that
poverty alone had prevented the parents' divorce and legitimation of their present relationships. The Raya court noted the
danger of imposing on the poor standards adopted from the
well-to-do, standards that "may avoid a theoretical discrimination and create a practical one.,,7 The court stressed that in
wardship proceedings, the welfare of the child must be the
paramount concern. The dominant parental right to custody
requires an extreme situation before judicial intervention may
be justified. Finding no such evidence in this case, the court
terminated the children's wardship.
Raya was followed in almost identical circumstances in In
Re A.l.8 Here, a section 600 petition was sustained by reason
of the mother's "depravity." Such depravity was based solely
on the mother's cohabitation with a man not her husband.
Here, too, poverty alone prevented the mother from marrying
the man with whom she was living. The reviewing court
adopted the rationale of Raya and refused to apply "dominant
socio-economic standards which might compel the institutionalization of the child."
In Re L 9 applied familiar due-process requirements to dependency proceedings. In this case, a child whose mother was
found unfit was removed from the mother's custody by the
juvenile court. Previously, the child's parents had divorced,
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6. 255 Cal. App.2d 260, 266-267,
63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 256.
7. 255 Cal. App.2d 260, 267-268, 63
Cal. Rptr. 252, 257.
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8. 274 Cal. App.2d 225, 78 Cal. Rptr.
880 (1969).
9. 267 Cal. App.2d 397, 73 Cal. Rptr.
76 (1968).
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and the divorce decree had deprived the father of the child's
custody. Once the juvenile court had assumed jurisdiction
of the child, however, such jurisdiction was exclusive with
regard to the minor's custody. The L Court, like the Raya
Court, took note of the strong policy of the civil code to preserve both the right and responsibility of a parent with regard
to custody of the child. The same policy is manifested in the
juvenile code. Thus, Welfare and Institutions Code section
726 precludes deprivation of the parents' right to custody of
their child, even though the child be a ward of the court, except in very limited circumstances. Protection of the parents'
rights demands that custody be denied only as the result of
proceedings that satisfy due process requirements. Accordingly, In Re L holds that such custody could not be withheld
without an express finding by the court that the child's father
was incapable of providing proper custody and control.
A final dependency case, In Re Schmidt/a states that the
jurisdiction of a juvenile court is not geographically limited.
The location of the proceedings is deemed a matter of venue
rather than of jurisdiction. Attack on such an issue was held·
to be appropriate, then, only by appeal and not by collateral
proceedings.
G. Miscellaneous

An unreported case, Gonzalez v. M ailliard, 11 attacked the
constitutionality of Welfare and Institutions Code section 601
because of vagueness. As of this printing, no decision has
been rendered.
In In Re M.G.S.,12 the court, relying upon Gault, appears to
conclude, in dictum, that the failure of counsel to present the
defense of a minor's insanity deprives the minor of his constitutional right to effective aid of counsel.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 proceedings.
as described above, permit continued incarceration of a minor
10. 268 Cal. App.2d 137, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 791 (1968).
11. Civil Action No. 50424, N.D.
Calif., (December 9, 1968).
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who reaches 21 years of age but whose release would constitute
a physical danger to the pUblic. The court in In Re ].F.13
notes that such a commitment is based primarily on a prediction of what the minor is likely to do in the future. The very
grave constitutional problems inherent in such a provision for
preventive detention, however, are merely raised and neither
discussed nor decided in this opinion.
H. School Cases

The constitutional consideration for minors illustrated by
Gault and Kent has now been extended with equal vigor to
the minor's relationship with his school in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.14 In an
already famous dictum, the United States Supreme Court stated, "[I]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."15 The students in Tinker were
suspended from school for wearing black armbands to publicize their objections to the Vietnam war. The Court found
their activity to be "closely akin to 'pure speech,' " and thus
entitled to protection under the First Amendment. The Court
placed a heavy burden on school authorities to justify infringement of students' First Amendment rights. This burden requires the school officials to sustain a clear showing that a
student's "engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operations of the school.' »16 By contrast, "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough."17
The Court thus recognized students to be citizens. "Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/19

13. 268 Cal. App.2d 761, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 464 (1969).

16. 393 U.S. 503, 509, 21 L.Ed.2d
731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 733, 738.

14. 393 U.S. 503, 21 L.Ed.2d 731,
89 S.Ct. 733 (1969).

17. 393 U.S. 503, 508, 21 L.Ed.2d
731, 738-739, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737.

15. 393 U.S. 503, 506, 21 L.Ed.2d
731, 737, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736.
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They are possessed of fundamental rights.

"18

The underlying rationale in Tinker is the Court's appreciation that education does not occur only within the classroom.
"In our system, students may not be regarded as closed
circuit recipients. . . ."19 Education does not take place
only when it is ".
. confined to the supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom.
Among those activities [which occur within a school] is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not
only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it
is also an important part of the educational process."20 Tinker
thus provides a significantly new view of the student as a responsible individual actively participating in his own education.
Students are recognized to be "constitutional" persons in the
case of Meyers v. Arcata Union High School District. 1 Meyers
was ejected from school for violation of a school policy that
stated that "extremes of hair style are not acceptable."
The court first found that hair styles are entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment. School authorities may
nevertheless regulate the exercise of this constitutional right,
as well as others, so long as they do so in a constitutionally
satisfactory manner. Ironically, the school authorities could
have drawn upon their residual statutory authority, commented the court, to regulate hair style on a showing of its disruptive effect. Precisely this result was reached in the case of
Akin v. Riverside School District Board of Education. 2 But
the Arcata authorities relied instead on their written policy,
which the court found to be unconstitutionally vague. First
Amendment rights, stated the court, may be regulated "only
18. 393 U.S. 503, 511, 21 L.Ed.2d
731,740, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739.
19. 393 U.S. 503, 511, 21 L.Ed.2d
731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739.
20. 393 U.S. 503, 512, 21 L.Ed.2d
731, 741, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739-740.
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1. 269 Cal. App.2d 549, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (1969); for further discussion
of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, in this volume.
2. 262 Cal. App.2d 161, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 557 (1968).
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with narrow specificity," and the phrase "extremes of hair
styles" did not satisfy this exacting standard. 3
Alvarez v. Santa Clara Unified School District,4 follows
Tinker in according California school students the right
to wear politically significant berets and buttons in California schools.4.5 On the other hand, In Re Donaldson,5 a
locker search case, disregards Tinker's introduction of the
Constitution to the school campus. The opinion resorts to discredited rhetoric, reminiscent of apologies for the juvenile
court, to describe a school principal as acting in loco parentis.
The court improperly finds the principal not to be a state
official within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such a finding is unsupportable in light of Tinker. Having
committed both these mistakes, the court is able to conclude
incorrectly that marijuana obtained in an unlawful search and
seizure by the school principal was properly admitted to sustain a subsequent juvenile court delinquency petition.
V. Conclusion
California juvenile law in no way resembles a "kangaroo
court";6 the legislature has seen to that. The rudimentary
prerequisites enumerated by the United States Supreme Court
in Kent and Gault are available to minors in California. But
much remains to be done, both because the United States

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/19

3. The face of the land is presently
obscured by hirsute judicial decisions.
See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034,
(7th Cir. 1969); Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697
(5th Cir. 1968); Richards v. Thurston,
304 F. Supp. 499, 38 U.S. Law Week,
2187 D. Mass. (Sept. 30, 1969) (a
stylish decision by Massachusetts District Judge Wyzanski).
4. N.D. Cal. Civil No. 50926 (1969).
4.5. Two cases challenging the constitutionality of § 9012 and § 9013 of
the California Education Code, which
provide a blanket prohibition against the
distribution of "propaganda" on school
premises, are currently pending before
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a three-jUdge federal court, O'Reilly v.
San Francisco Unified School District,
N.D. Cal. Civil No. 51427 (leaflets),
Rowe v. Campbell Union High School
District, N.D. Cal. Civil No. 51060 (underground newspaper). A temporary
restraining order was issued in the Rowe
case enjoining the school authorities
from interfering with distribution of
the underground newspaper pending the
hearing before the three-judge court.
5. 269 Cal. App.2d 509, 75 CaL
Rptr. 220 (1969).
6. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28, 18 L.
Ed.2d 527, 546-547, 87 S.Ct. 1428,
1444 (1967).
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Supreme Court itself has only begun to domesticate juvenile
law and because the California Supreme Court has been zealous to confine these beginnings. The holdings of Kent, Gault,
and Tinker go no farther than they do because no more was
required to dispose of the issues before the Court. A fair reading of these decisions, though, demonstrates the Court's dissatisfaction with the rule of rhetoric. The cases consolidate
contemporary youth's expectation of equal justice without
regard to age. Indeed, Gault, in particular, evidences the
Court's solicitude for minors; their separate and unequal treatment can be justified only when the juvenile law affords
them some demonstrable benefit.
In Re M and Lara fail to fulfill the expectation. They show
little more than lip service to the reality of the minors' situations, of the state's patterns and problems of delinquency, or
of the thrust of the juvenile process. Much of the now-discredited folklore and sentimenf still pervades those decisions
and precludes any recognition of the implications of Gault and
Kent.
Lara and In Re M, taken together, make plain the California Supreme Court's determination to defer to the legislature's
1961 and 1967 revisions of the juvenile code and, at the
same time, to ignore the policy considerations that impelled
tho~e revisions, in the same way that the court has disregarded
the philosophy inherent in Gault and Kent. Silence, from
either source, presumably provides a rationale for immobility.
The revolution that Judge Bazelon predicted8 has hardly
begun. Gault and Kent presage the erosion of the old rhetoric.
But the California courts must acknowledge those cases as
seminal, not exceptional. "The highest motives and most enlightened impulses" no longer justify uncritical perpetuation of
the "peculiar system for juveniles.,,9 The California courts
must still embark on that "candid appraisal"lo of the system
that the United States Supreme Court and the times demand.
7. 387 U.S. 1, 21, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
541-542, 87 s.Ct. 1428, 1440.
8. Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d
408.
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9. 387 U.S. 1, 17, 18 L.Ed.2d 527.
540, 87 s.Ct. 1428, 1438 (1967).
10. 387 U.S. 1, 21, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
541-542, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1440.
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APPENDIX
Constitutional
Rights

U. S. Supreme
Court Cases

California
Statutes

I.

Adequate
Notice

In Re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967)

W & I Code §§ 630,
630.1,658, 660

II.

Right to
Counsel

In Re Gault

W & I Code §§ 625,
627.5, 633, 634,
679,700

California Cases

In Re M. G. S.,
72 Cal. Rptr. 808
(1968)
People v. Cooper,
268 Cal. App.2d 34,
73 Cal. Rptr. 608
(1968)

III.

Self-Incrimination

In Re Gault

W & I Code §§ 625
(Miranda warning
required) 627.5, 702.5

IV.

Confrontation
and CrossExamination

In Re Gault

W & I Code §§ 630,
702.5

V.

Right of Appeal
(Adequate
Review)

In Re Gault (not
decided)

VI.

Right to
Transcript of
Proceedings

VII.

Rules of
Evidence
A. Admissibility of
Hearsay

Scott v. Mayer,
(N.D. Cal. Civil No.
C-FO 441GSL, 1970)

Kent v. U. S.,
383 U.S. 541 (1966)

W & I Code § 800

In Re Corey,
72 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1968)
In Re F,
75 Cal. Rptr. 887
(1969)
In Re R,
83 Cal. Rptr. 671
(1970)

B. Standard
of Proof

In Re Whittington,
391 U.S. 341 (1968)
De Backer v.
Brainard,

396 U.S. 28,
90 S.Ct. 179 (1969)

W & I Code § 701

In Re M,
75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (\969)
In Re K. D. K.,
75 Cal. Rptr. 136
(1969)

In Re Winship,
396 U.S. - , 25 L Ed
2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 179
(1969)
C. General

In Re M. G. S.,
72 Cal. Rptr. 808
(1968)
In Re Rambeau,
72 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1968)
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Constitutional
Rights
VIII.

Pre-judicial
Stage Rights

IX.

Postadjudicative Rights

X.

Right to
Bail

XI.

Right to
Arraignment

XII.

Right to
Indictment by
Grand Jury

XIII.

Right to
Public Trial

XIV.

.search and
Seizure
(4th Amendment)

XV.

Right to Trial
by Jury

U. S. Supreme
Court Cases

Arrest Without Warrant
in Misdemeanor Cases

XVII.

Waiver of
Miranda
Rights

California Cases

In Re Donaldson,
75 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1968)
De Backer v.
Brainard,
396 U.S. 28,
90 S.Ct. 163 (1969)
In Re Gault
(not decided)

XVI.

California
Statutes

In Re T. R. S.,
81 Cal. Rptr. 574
(1969)

(Waiver ok)
People v. Lara,
62 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1967)
In Re M,
75 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1969)
People v. Camarillo
72 Cal. Rptr. 296
(1968)
(No waiver-"totality
of circumstances")
In Re Butterfield,
61 Cal. Rptr. 874
(1967)
In Re Teters,
7() Cal. Rpt-. 749
(1968)
In Re H. L. R.,
75 Cal. Rptr. 308
(1969)
In Re Rambeau,
72 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1%8)
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Constitutional
Rights

U. S. Supreme
Court Cases

XVIII. First Amendment School
Rights

Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,
393 U.S. 503 (1969)

California
Statutes

Appendix
California Cases
Meyers v. Arcata
Union High School
Dist.,
75 Cal. Rptr. 68
(1969)
Akin v. Riverside
School District Board
of Education,
68 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1968)
Alvarez v. Santa Clara
Unified School Dist.
(N. D. Cal. Civil No.
50926, 1969)
Rowe v. Campbell
Union High Schcol
District, N. D. Cal.
Civil No. 51060
O'Reilly v. San
Francisco Unified
School District,
N. D. Cal. Civil
No. 51427

XIX.
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Fifth Amendment
( Vagueness)

Gonzalez v. Mailliard,
Civil Action No.
50424, (N. D., Cal.,
Dec. 9, 1969)

CAL LAW 1970

34

